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Abstract
This paper develops an approach to measure the information content of a biometric feature repre-
sentation. We define biometric information as the decrease in uncertainty about the identity of a person
due to a set of biometric measurements. We then show that the biometric feature information for a
person may be calculated by the relative entropy D(p‖q) between the population feature distribution
q and the person’s feature distribution p. The biometric information for a system is the mean D(p‖q)
for all persons in the population. In order to practically measure D(p‖q) with limited data samples,
we introduce an algorithm which regularizes a Gaussian model of the feature covariances. An example
of this method is shown for PCA and Fisher linear discriminant (FLD) based face recognition, with
biometric feature information calculated to be 45.0 bits (PCA), 37.0 bits (FLD) and 55.6 bits (fusion
of PCA and FLD features). Finally, we discuss general applications of this measure.
Index Terms
Biometric features, Relative entropy, Face recognition, Information content
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I. INTRODUCTION
How much information is there in a face, or a fingerprint? This question is related to many
issues in biometric technology. For example, one of the most common biometric questions
is that of uniqueness, eg. to what extent are fingerprints unique? From the point of view of
identifiability, one may be interested in how much identifying information is available from
a given technology, such as video surveillance. In the context of biometric fusion [19] one
would like to be able to quantify the biometric information in each system individually, and the
potential gain from fusing the systems. Additionally, such a measure is relevant to biometric
cryptosystems and privacy measures. Several authors have presented approaches relevant to this
question. For example, Wayman et al. [23] introduced a set of statistical approaches to measure
the separability of Gaussian feature distributions using a “cotton ball model”. Another approach
was developed by Daugman [7] to measure the information content of iris images based on the
discrimination entropy [6], calculated directly from the match score distributions. Also, Golfarelli
et al. [11] showed that the most commonly used feature representations of handgeometry and
face biometrics have a limited number of distinguishable patterns, on the order of 105 and 103,
respectively, as measured by a theoretical estimate of the equal error rate. Other authors have used
information theoretic approaches, such as the approach of Ross and Jain [19] to biometric fusion.
However, none of these methods approach measurement of information content of biometric data
from an information theoretic point of view.
In this paper we elaborate an approach to address this question based on definitions from
information theory [2]. We define the term “biometric information” as follows:
biometric information: the decrease in uncertainty about the identity of a person due to a set
of biometric features measurements
In order to interpret this definition, we refer to two instants: 1) before a biometric measurement,
t0, at which time we only know a person p is part of a population q, which may be the whole
planet; and 2) after receiving a set of measurements, t1, we have more information and less
uncertainty about the person’s identity.
In order to motivate our approach, we initially consider the properties that such a measure
should have. Consider a soft biometric system which measures height and weight; furthermore,
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assume all humans are uniformly and independently distributed in height between 100–200 cm
and weight between 100–200 lb. If a person’s features were completely stable and could be
measured with infinite accuracy, people could be uniquely identified from these measurements,
and the biometric features could be considered to yield infinite information. However, in reality,
repeated biometric measurements give different results due to measurement inaccuracies, and
to short- and long-term changes in the biometric features themselves. If this variability results
in an uncertainty of ± 5 cm and ±5 lb, one simple model would be to round each measure
to 105, 115, ..., 195. In this case, there are 10 × 10 equiprobable outcomes, and an information
content of log2(100) = 6.6 bits.
Such an analysis is intrinsically tied to a choice of biometric features. Thus, our approach
does not allow us to answer “how much information is in a fingerprint?”, but only “how much
information is in the position and angle data of fingerprint minutiae?”. Furthermore, for many
biometrics, it is not clear what the underlying features are. Face images, for example, can be
described by image basis features or landmark based features. To overcome this, we may choose
to calculate the information in all possible features. In the example, we may provide height in
inches as well as cm; however, in this case, a good measure of information must not increase
with such redundant data.
Based on the definition of introduced, this paper develops a mathematical framework to
measure biometric feature information for a given system and set of biometric features. In
practice, there are limited numbers of samples of each person, which makes our measure ill-
conditioned. In order to address this issue, we develop a stable algorithm based on a distribution
modeling and regularization. We then use this algorithm to analyze the biometric information
content of two different face recognition algorithms.
II. METHODS
In this section we develop an algorithm to calculate biometric information based on a set
of features, using the relative entropy measure [6]. We explain our method in the following
steps: 1) measure requirements, 2) relative entropy of biometric features, 3) Gaussian models
for biometric features and relative entropy calculations, 4) regularization methods for degenerate
features, 5) regularization methods for insufficient data.
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A. Requirements for biometric feature information
In order to elaborate the requirements that a good measure of biometric feature information
must have, we consider system that measures height and weight. These values differ within the
global population, but also vary for a given individual, both due to variations in the features
themselves and to measurement inaccuracies. We now wish to consider the properties a measure
of biometric feature information should have:
1) If an intra-person distribution p is exactly equal to the inter-person q distribution, then
there is no information to distinguish a person, and biometric feature information is zero.
2) As the feature measurement becomes more accurate (less variability), then it is easier
to distinguish someone in the population and the biometric information increases (this
criterion may appear counterintuitive, but a biometric system is being evaluated, not the
raw feature values).
3) If a person has unusual feature values (i.e. far from the population mean), they become
more distinguishable, and their biometric feature information will be larger.
4) The biometric information of uncorrelated features should be the sum of the biometric
information of each individual feature.
5) Features that are unrelated to identity should not increase biometric information. For
example, if a biometric system accurately measured the direction a person was facing,
information on identity would be unchanged.
6) Correlated features such as height and weight are less informative. In an extreme example
consider the height in inches and in cm. Clearly, these two features are no more informative
than a single value.
Based on this definition, the most appropriate information theoretic measure for the biometric
feature information is the relative entropy (D(p‖q)) [6] between the intra- (p(x)) and inter-person
(q(x)) biometric feature distributions. D(p‖q), or the Kullback-Leibler distance, is defined to be
the “extra bits” of information needed to represent p(x) with respect to q(x). D(p‖q) is defined
to be
D(p‖q) =
∫
x
p(x)log2
p(x)
q(x)
dx (1)
where the integral is over all feature dimensions, x. p(x) is the probability mass function or
distribution of features of an individual and q(x) is the overall population distribution. A comment
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on notation: we use p to refer to both an individual person, and the distribution of the person’s
features, while q represents the population and the distribution of its features.
This measure can be motivated as follows: the relative entropy, D(p‖q), is the extra information
required to describe a distribution p(x) based on an assumed distribution q(x) [6]. D(p‖q) differs
from the entropy, H(p), which is the information required, on average, to describe features x
distributed as p(x). H is not in itself an appropriate measure for biometric feature information,
since it does not account the extent to which each feature can identify a person p in a population
q. An example of a feature unrelated to identity is the direction a person is facing. Measuring
this quantity will increase H of a feature set, but not increase its ability to identify a person. The
measure D(p‖q) corresponds to the requirements: given a knowledge of the population feature
distribution q, the information in a biometric feature set allows us to describe a particular person
p.
B. Distribution modeling
In a generic biometric system, F biometric features are measured, to create a biometric feature
vector x (F×1) for each person. For person p, we have Np features samples, while we have
Nq samples for the population. For convenience of notation, we sort p’s measurements to be the
first grouping of the population. Defining x as an instance of random variable X , we calculate
the population feature mean µq
µq = E
q
[X] =
1
Nq
Nq∑
i=1
xi (2)
where the feature mean of person p, µp, is defined analogously, replacing q by p. The population
feature covariance Σq is
Σq = E
q
[
(X − µq)t(X − µq)
]
=
1
Nq − 1
Nq∑
i=1
(xi − µq)t(xi − µq) (3)
where the feature correlation of person p. The individuals feature convariance, Σp, is again
defined analogously.
Features are calculated from a set of Nq images using different component analysis methods
such as Principal Component Analysis (PCA, also referred to as Eigenface features) [12][21] and
Fisher linear discriminant (FLD) [13]. µp and µq are F×1 vectors of the population and individual
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mean distributions, while Σp and Σq are F×F matrices of the individual and population
covariance matrices.
One important general difficulty with direct information theoretic measures is that of data
availability. Distributions are difficult to estimate accurately, especially at the tails; and yet
log2 (p(x)/q(x)) will give large absolute values for small p(x) or q(x). Instead, it is typical to
fit data to a model with a small number of parameters. The Gaussian distribution is the most
common model; it is often a good reflection of the real world distributions, and is analytically
solvable in entropy integrals. Another important property of the Gaussian is that it gives the
maximum entropy for a given standard deviation, allowing such models to be used to give an
upper bound to entropy values. Based on the Gaussian model, which seems to be the simplest
and appropriate for p and q, we write:
p(x) =
1√|2piΣp|exp
(
−1
2
(
x− µp
)t
Σp
−1 (x− µp)) (4)
q(x) =
1√|2piΣq|exp
(
−1
2
(
x− µq
)t
Σq
−1 (x− µq)) (5)
From which we can calculate D(p‖q).
D(p‖q) =
∫
p(x) (log2p(x)− log2q(x)) dx (6)
= −k
(
ln|2piΣp| − ln|2piΣq|+ 1− E
p
[(
x− µq
)t
Σq
−1 (x− µq)]) (7)
= k
(
ln
|2piΣq|
|2piΣp| + trace
(
(Σp +T)Σq
−1 − I)) (8)
where T = (µp − µq)t(µp − µq) and k = log2
√
e.
This expression calculates the relative entropy in bits for Gaussian distributions p(x) and
q(x). This expression corresponds to most of the desired requirements for a biometric feature
information measure introduced in the previous section:
1) If person’s feature distribution matches the population, p = q; this yields D(p‖q) = 0, as
required.
2) As feature measurements improve, the covariance values, Σp, will decrease, resulting in a
reduction in |Σp|, and an increase in D(p‖q).
3) If a person has feature values far from the population mean, T will be larger, resulting in
an larger value of D(p‖q).
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4) Combinations of uncorrelated feature vectors yield the sum of the individual D(p‖q) mea-
sures. Thus, for uncorrelated features f1 and f2, where {f1, f2} represents concatenation
of the feature vectors, D(p(f1)‖q(f1)) +D(p(f2)‖q(f2)) = D(p({f1, f2})‖q({f1, f2}))
5) Addition of features uncorrelated to identity will not change D(p‖q). Such a feature will
have an identical distribution in p and q. If U is the set of such uncorrelated features,
[Σp]ij = [Σq]ij = 0 for i or j ∈ U , and i 6= j, while [Σp]ii = [Σq]ii and [µq]i = [µp]i.
Under these conditions, D(p‖q) will be identical to its value when excluding the features
in U . One way to understand this criterion is that if the distributions for q and p differ for
features in U , then those features can be used as a biometric to help identify a person.
6) Correlated features are less informative than uncorrelated ones. Such features will decrease
the condition number (and thus the determinant) of both Σp and Σq. This will decrease
the accuracy of the measure D(p‖q). In the extreme case of perfectly correlated features,
Σp becomes singular with a zero determinant and D(p‖q) is undefined. Thus, our measure
is inadequate in this case. In the next section, we develop an algorithm to deal with this
effect.
C. Regularization Methods for degenerate features
In order to guard against numerical instability in our measures, we wish to extract a mutually
independent set of G “important” features (G ≤ F ). To do this, we use the principal component
analysis (PCA) [10][12] to generate a mapping (Ut : X → Y ), from the original biometric
features X (F × 1) to a new feature space Y of size G× 1. The PCA may be calculated from
a Singular Value Decomposition (SVD) [3] of the feature covariance matrix, such that
USqU
t = svd(cov(X)) = svd(Σq) (9)
Since Σq is positive definite, U is orthonormal and Sq is diagonal. We choose to perform the
PCA on the population distribution q, rather than p, since q is based on far more data, and is
therefore likely to be a more reliable estimate. The values of Sq indicate the significance of
each feature in PCA space. A feature j, with small [Sq]j,j will have very little effect on the
overall biometric feature information. We use this analysis, in order to regularize Σq, and to
reject degenerate features by truncating the SVD. We select a truncation threshold of j where
[Sq]j,j < 10
−10[Sq]1,1. Based on this threshold, Sq is truncated to be G×G, and U is truncated
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to F × G. Using the basis U calculated from the population, we decompose the individual’s
covariance into feature space Y:
Sp = U
tΣpU (10)
where Sp is not necessarily a diagonal matrix. However, since p and q describe somewhat similar
data, we expect Sp to have a strong diagonal component, as seen in Fig. 4.
Based on this regularization scheme, (8) may be rewritten in the PCA space as:
D(p‖q) = k (β + trace U ((Sp + St)Sq−1 − I)Ut) (11)
where β = ln |Sq ||Sp| and St = U
tTU
D. Regularization Methods for insufficient data
The expression developed in the previous section solves the problem of ill-poseness of Σq.
However, Σp may still be singular in the common circumstance in which only a small number
of samples of each individual are available. Given Np images of an individual from which G
features are calculated, Σp will be singular if G ≥ Np, which will result in D(p‖q) diverging
to ∞. In practice, this is a common occurrence, since most biometric systems calculate many
hundreds of features, and there are only rarely more then ten of samples of each person. In order
to address this issue, we develop an estimate which may act as a lower bound. In order to do
this, we make the following assumptions:
1) Estimates of feature variances are valid [Sp]i,i for all i.
2) Estimates of feature covariances [Sp]i,j for i 6= j are only valid for the most important L
features, where L < Np.
Features which are not considered valid based on these assumptions, are set to zero by multiplying
Sq by a mask M, where
M =
 1, if i = j or (i < L and j < L);0, otherwise (12)
Using (12), [Sp]i,j = (Mi,j)[UtΣpU]i,j .
This expression regularizes the intra-person covariance, Σp, and assures that D(p‖q) does
not diverge. To clarify the effect of this regularization on D(p‖q), we note that intra-feature
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covariances will decrease |Σp| toward zero, leading a differential entropy estimate diverging to∞.
We thus consider this regularization strategy to generate a lower bound on the biometric feature
information. The selection of L is a compromise between using all available measurements (by
using large L) and avoiding numerical instability when Sp is close to singular (by using small
L).
E. Average information of a biometric system
This section has developed a measure of biometric feature information content of a biometric
feature representation of a single individual with respect to the feature distribution of the
population. As discussed, the biometric feature information will vary between people; those
with feature values further from the mean have larger biometric feature information. In order to
use this approach to measure the biometric feature information content of a biometric system,
we calculate the average biometric feature information for each individual in the population
(weighted by the probability of needing to identify that person, if appropriate).
III. FACE RECOGNITION
Fig. 1. An example of PCA (Eigenface) face features. From left to right, PCA features number 2, 5, 25, 60 are shown. The
PCA features are othonormal and fit the data in a least squares sense.
Information in a feature representation of faces is calculated using our described method for
different individuals. In order to test our algorithm, it is necessary to have multiple images of
the same individual.For this reason, using the Aberdeen face database [4], we chose 18 frontal
images of 16 persons, from which we calculate the PCA (eigenface) features using the algorithm
of [12] and the FLD face features components using the algorithm described in [24]. Initially,
all face images were registered by rotation and scaling to have eye positions at (50, 90) and
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Fig. 2. An example of FLD face features. From left to right, FLD features number 2, 5, 25, 60 are shown. FLD attempts to
maximize class separation while minimizing the within class scatter.
(100, 90). Images were then cropped to 150 × 200 pixels and histogram equalized to cover
the intensity range 0–255. The same set of operations is applied to all images using the same
thresholds. This results with the same effect on all images when computing the biometric feature
information.
The feature decomposition process was conducted on 18 images of each of 16 persons,
giving 288 total images. For PCA and Fisher feature decompositions, 288 seperate vectors were
computed, and the most significant 100 features used for subsequent analysis. Fig. 1 and Fig. 2
illustrate PCA and FLD features, respectively. From this, D(p‖q) is computed for each of 16
persons using (11), which assumes that p and q have Gaussian distributions. In order to test the
validity of the Gaussian model for our data, we use the following normality tests:
• Kolmogorov-Smirnov test: compares the distributions of values in the two data vectors X1
and X2, where X1 represents random samples from the underlying distribution and X2
follows an ideal Gaussian with zero mean and variance. The null hypothesis is that X1 and
X2 are drawn from the same continuous normal distribution. We reject the null hypothesis
at p < 0.01.
• The Lilliefors test [5]: evaluates the hypothesis that x has a normal distribution with
unspecified mean and variance, against the alternative that x does not have a normal
distribution. This test compares the empirical distribution of X with a normal distribution
having the same mean and variance as X . We reject the null hypothesis at p < 0.01.
Using these tests, on average 89% of the marginal distribution of all the FLD and PCA
computed features is normally distributed.
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Fig. 3. Biometric information as a function of feature number (circles) for (A) PCA (Eigenface) and (B) FLD (bottom) face
feature decomposition.
Fig. 4. The regularized intra-person covariance matrix Sp showing dominant components along its diagonal. Since Σp represents
similar information to Σq it is reasonable to expect the matrices have similar eigenvectors, resulting in strong diagonal components
in Σp.
A. Biometric information calculations
After fitting the distributions of p(x) and q(x) to a Gaussian model, we initially analyse
the biometric feature information in each PCA and Fisher feature separately. PCA features are
shown in Fig. 3, and show a gradual decrease from an initial peak at feature 2. The form
of the curve can be understood from the nature of the PCA decomposition, which tends to
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Fig. 5. Biometric information (in bits) (y-axis) vs. the mask size (L) (x-axis) for each person. Each subfigure represents a
different value of Np (images of the same person): (A) 8, (B) 12, (C) 16 and (D) 18. The curves show that D(p‖q) diverges
as Σp becomes singular (L ≥ Np). The relative entropy increases with the size of the mask.
place higher frequency details in higher number features. Since noise tends to increase with
frequency, the biometric information in these higher numbered PCA features will be less. A
sum of biometric feature information over the first 100 PCA features gives 40.5 bits. This does
not assume statistical independence nor uncorrelatedness of PCA coefficients. Biometric feature
information calculated using FLD features seems to be similar to PCA features such that most
biometric feature information is computed for the most dominant fisherfaces.
In order to calculate D(p‖q) for all features, we are limited by the available information. Since
Np = 18 images are used to calculate the covariances, attempts to calculate D(p‖q) for more
than 17 features will fail, because Σp is singular. This effect is seen in the condition number
(ratio of the largest to the smallest singular value) which was 4.82×103 for Sq and 1.32×1020
for Sp. The relatively small condition number of Sq indicates that no features are degenerate for
PCA and FLD face recognition features. However, Sp is severely ill-conditioned. To overcome
this ill-conditioning, we introduced a regularization scheme based on a mask (equation 12) with
a cut-off point L. This scheme is motivated by the diagonal structure of Sp, as shown in Fig. 4.
To ensure convergence, the mask size L is set to a value smaller than Np.
We solve this singularity of (11) using a mask for Sp based on a parameter L. To further
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explore the effect of parameters L and Np, we artificially reduce the Np by randomly eliminating
some images from individuals. Results for D(p‖q) for PCA features for each person as a function
of L are shown in Fig. 5 for Np = 8, 12, 16 and 18. In these curves, we observe a “hockey
stick” shape. The relative entropy measure remains stable when L < Np, but if L ≥ Np, we
observe a dramatic increase in D(p‖q) as the algorithm approaches a singularity of Σp and the
ill-conditioning of Σq. When L < Np, D(p‖q) is stable with a lower and upper bounds between
35 to 50 bits. However, when L ≥ Np, D(p‖q) estimates start diverging and reach very large
values.
Clearly, points for L greater than the knee in the hockey stick do not represent accurate
estimates of D(p‖q). We also argue that when L approaches Np, the inherent ill-conditioning
of Σp makes the our algorithm over-estimate D(p‖q). On the other hand, small values of L
will under-estimate D(p‖q), since these values will mask inter-feature correlations. This effect
increases |Sp| as L decreases. However, the results suggest that this effect is minor, especially
in Fig. 4A and 4B, where the “base” of the hockey stick is more flat. In order to produce an
unique and stable estimate for D(p‖q), it is necessary to choose a compromise between these
effects. We recommend choosing L = 3
4
Np, since a larger value of L puts the estimate in an
unstable region of Fig. 4.
Using this algorithm and value of L, we calculate the overall biometric feature information
for different face recognition algorithms. For PCA features, the average D(p‖q) is 45.0 bits,
and for FLD features D(p‖q) is 37.0 bits. If PCA and FLD features are combined (making
200 features in all), average D(p‖q) is 55.6 bits. This combination of features illustrates that a
biometric fusion of similar features may offer very little information above that of the individual
underlying features. It is intially somewhat surprising that FLD feature information is measured
to be lower than that from PCA. This results may be understood becuase PCA features retain
unwanted information due to variations in facial expression and lighting, while FLD ”projects
away” variations in lighting and facial expression while maintaining the discriminant features. .
In addition, feature decomposition using independent component analysis (ICA) [10] was also
conducted on the same set of faces. ICA has the advantage that it does not only decorrelate
the signals but also reduces higher-order statistical dependencies in order to make the signals as
statistically independent as possible [14]. Since ICA maximizes non-gaussianity, it fits less well
to the assumptions of our model. For ICA features, an average of 39.0 bits was computed for
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D(p‖q).
IV. DISCUSSION
This paper has introduced a definition of biometric feature information and an algorithm to
measure it from a set of population and individual biometric features, as measured by a biometric
algorithm under test. Biometric information is defined in terms of the reduction in uncertainty
of the identity of a person resulting from a set of biometric feature measurements. Based on this
definition, we show that this concept matches the information theoretic concept of relative entropy
D(p‖q), where p is the probability distribution of the persons’s features, and q is the distribution
of features of the population. Examples of its application were shown for two different face
recognition algorithms based on PCA (Eigenface) and FLD feature decompositions. Clearly, the
framework developed in this paper depends on accurate estimates of the population distributions
q. Developing a good estimate of the ”world model” is known to be a hard problem; in this
work, we use the typical approach of assuming our database is an adequate representation of
the population.
The result of our calculations (approximately 40 bits per face) is reasonable when compared
with previous analysis of face recognition accuracy. From the FRVT results, we extrapolate the
gallery size for an identification rate of 0.5 ([17], [18]). This is taken to be a rough model of
the population for which the algorithm can reduce the identity uncertainty to 50%. For the top
three algorithms, the gallery sizes were 1.67 × 108, 3.53 × 107, and 2.33 × 106, corresponding
to 27.3, 25.1, and 21.2 bits. This value is over half that calculated here, and is reasonable since
the FRVT database appears to be significantly more difficult than the one used here [4], and
current face recognition algorithms are not yet considered to be close to optimal since they
seem to use approximately 1/2 to 2/3 of the available feature information. Similarly, our work
on biometric encryption [1] seemed to suggest an upper limit of approximately 20 bits of key
into face images, using the algorithm of [20].
As an exploration of the implications of this work, an analogy can be made between a biometric
system and a traditional communication system in terms of information capacity [6]. The signal
source transmits one symbol from an alphabet; this corresponds to one person from a population
to be identified. The symbol is encoded and sent across a channel and is subject to channel noise;
similarly, biometric features from a person are measured, and are subject to variability due to
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noise in the measurement system and to inherent feature variability. Thus the biometric feature
measurement system corresponds to the communication channel. The communications system
receiver detects a signal and must decide which symbol was sent, corresponding to the role of
the biometrics identification process. In this context, D(p‖q) is the differential information of
a single signal, and the average D(p‖q), weighted by the probability of each signal p, is the
channel capacity. Based on this analogy, we can say that biometric feature information is the
channel capacity of a biometric measurement system.
In a general biometric system, the following issues associated with biometric features must
be considered:
• Feature distributions vary. Features, such as minutiae ridge angles may be uniformly dis-
tributed over 0–2pi, while other features may be better modeled as Gaussian. In this paper,
all features are modeled as Gaussian. This is valid model for most PCA and FLD features,
but is not valid for any ICA features (since ICA is designed to maximize non-Gaussianity).
On the other hand, a Gaussian model may be considered to estimate an upper bound for
the entropy.
• Raw sample images need to be processed by alignment and scaling before features can
be measured. Any variability in registration will dramatically increase the variability in
measured features and decrease the biometric feature information measure.
• Feature dimensionality may not be constant. For example, the number of available minutiae
points varies. The method presented in this paper does not address this issue, since the
dimensions of p(x) and q(x) must be the same. Generalized Entropy measures exist which
may allow an extension of this approach to non-constant dimensional features.
It is interesting to note that the biometric entropy is larger for some faces. Fig. 5 shows a
range of biometric information (from 32 to 47 bits) for different individuals, which may help
explain why some people are potentially easier to recognize than others. This is perhaps some
evidence for the “biometrics zoo” hypothesis [8]. In order to explore this effect, we plot the
biometric feature information as a function of average feature variance for each person (Fig. 6).
A significant correlation (p < .01) is detected, indicating that features are less variable in those
subjects with higher biometric feature information.
While we have introduced a measure in the context of face recognition, we anticipate that such
a measure may help address many questions in biometrics technology, such as the following:
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Fig. 6. Average D(p‖q) in bits (y-axis) as a function of the mean feature variance (arbitrary units) (x-axis) for 16 different
persons. The mean feature variance is computed by summing all the diagonal components of Sp matrix for each person. The
correlation coefficient is −0.62, which is significant at p < 0.01.
• Uniqueness of biometric features: A common question is ”are fingerprints really unique?”.
While Pankanti et al. [16] have recently provided a sophisticated analysis of this problem
based on biometric feature distributions directly, a general approach based on information
content would help address this question for other biometric modalities.
• Inherent limits to biometric template size requirements. A maximum compression of bio-
metric features will be limited to the biometric feature information. This theoretical lower
limit may be of use for ID card applications with limited data density.
• Feasibility of biometric encryption: Proposed biometric encryption systems use biometric
data to generate keys [22], and thus the availability of biometric feature information lim-
its the security of cryptographic key generation. In fact, the original motivation for this
work was from Smith [9] who wanted to quantify the cryptographic security of biometric
encryption.
• Performance limits of biometric matchers: While some algorithms outperform others, it
clear that there are ultimate limits to error rates, based on the information available in the
biometric features. In this application, the biometric feature information is related to the
discrimination entropy [7].
• Biometric fusion: Systems which combine biometric features are well understood to offer
increased performance [19]. It may be possible to use the measure of biometric feature
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information to quantify whether a given combination of features offers any advantage, or
whether the fused features are largely redundant. The example of fusion of FLD and PCA
(200 features) given here clearly falls into the latter category, since it does not necessarily
offer double the amount of information.
• Novel biometric features: Many novel biometric features have been suggested, but it is often
unclear whether a given feature offers much in the way of identifiable information. Biometric
information measurement may offer a way to validate the potential of such features.
• Privacy protection: It would be useful to quantify the threat to privacy posed by the release
of biometric feature information, and also to be able to quantify the value of technologies
to preserve privacy, such as algorithms to de-identify face images [15].
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